friedrich braun
January 19th, 2004, 01:19 AM
I'm posting a few excerpts from an article authored by Max Hocutt. The excerpts pertain to two recent writers on race issues (Cavalli-Sforza and Sykes). What follows is some mild criticism and commentary on the abovementioned conventional and peecee researchers. All academics live in a state of intellectual terrorism when it comes to conducting race-related studies, they must couch their findings in acceptable peecee language (notice the nonsensical double-talk emanating from Cavalli-Sforza, see below) if they want to keep getting funded by their respective institutions of higher learning; hence, they instinctively know that they're treading on very thin ice, an area where a false move could cost them their careers (see Rushton and Brand, for e.g.).
Is the Concept of Race Illegitimate?
MAX HOCUTT
(Max Hocutt is professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of Alabama.)
...
Cavalli-Sforza
Nearly a quarter century passed between the publication of the three essays in physical anthropology that I have just criticized and the publication of The Great Human Diasporas
by the population biologist Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza and his son Francesco (1995). Yet this recent book offers few new arguments. Instead, it repeats the old ones.
The authors begin the chapter “Race and Racism” by mentioning the evil of racism and by condemning research that they regard as racist.6 (6. Characteristically, Cavalli-Sforza uses the term loosely, describing as racist all research that draws attention to racial differences, even if its authors endorse no declaration of superiority and inferiority. Thus, Arthur Jensen’s work on IQ counts as racist by Cavalli-Sforza’s tendentious definition—a slick but not an admirable way to poison the wells of scientific research and to beg the question of whether its conclusions are sound.) They observe that race is often confused with nation or culture and complain that, given the looseness of the concept, no one can say how many races exist. They attribute the difficulty of making a count to the fact that many genetically related features of human beings vary continuously, leaving no breaks that provide clear demarcations between races.
After making these now familiar points, the Cavalli-Sforzas dilate on the difficulties that confront attempts to distinguish one race from another. They illustrate these difficulties by explaining, with a map, how interbreeding has obliterated once-obvious differences between the Etruscans who settled northern Italy and the Greek peoples who colonized the southern half of the boot. This blending of two formerly distinguishable races into one, the authors claim, shows that it never makes sense to talk of distinguishable races. Yet they also note that various European “peoples,” such as the
Basques of Spain and the Celts from Breton, differ not only culturally but also genetically (like races!). In this same “I can’t say ‘breakfast’” fashion, the Cavalli-Sforzas go on to aver that because Jews are a “heterogeneous people” from many parts of the world, there is no Jewish race. They admit, however, that “endogamy (marriage between individuals from the same group) was sufficiently widespread among the forebears of today’s Jews for them to continue to have a not insignificant level of genes in common and a certain resemblance” (236) (like members of the same race!).
Showing no awareness that they are giving back with one hand what they took with the other, the Cavalli-Sforzas go on to conclude, “The idea of race in the human species serves no purpose” (237). With the usual reflex, they attribute belief in race to the Nazi myth of racial purity and to an irrational but innate tribalism.7 (With consummate wit, a friend of mine calls this pseudoreasoning the argumentum ad nazium.) They then cite the mistreatment of Pygmies by their larger and more aggressive neighbors as a
regrettable example of our human tendency to divide the world up into them and us. Clearly, there is nothing new here, just the now-familiar arguments: that a belief in racial distinctions is wrong because it encourages racism; that no distinctions exist between races because the distinctions that do exist are not sharp and clear; that although racial differences may be real, it would be better to describe them as differences between “peoples”; that there are no races because there are no pure races; and so on. Having already refuted these arguments—or, rather, having shown how they refute themselves—I will not go over them again.
Instead, I will examine the only new argument to be found in the Cavalli-Sforza book. In the preface, the authors casually remark that racial distinctions are unimportant because they are limited to such trivial matters as skin color and bodily conformation. They return to this theme in chapter 8, claiming that although physical differences can be explained in genetic terms, no mental differences can be explained in this way. They declare, “The biological differences [between Pygmies and other groups] are obviously striking, and equally obviously superficial. . . . [T]he explanation [of the Pygmy economy] must lie in a radically different cultural legacy” (204); “[n]othing, however, is truly or solely innate in child or adult intelligence. On the contrary, intelligence is the product of personal experience, which is complex and differs from person to person” (219). Here we have one more example of faulty reasoning. Reduced to its essence, the argument is: racial distinctions are unreal because they are unimportant.8 For the sake of discussion, let us grant for the moment the premise that racial differences are superficial
and inconsequential because they are physical. Still, the conclusion—that racial differences are fictitious, imaginary, or mythical—does not follow. On the contrary, what follows is that racial differences must be real, for how else can they be trivial or superficial? The Cavalli-Sforzas have shot themselves in the foot.
Nor is that the worst of it: the gun was illegally obtained. That a certain difference between persons is unimportant is not a scientific judgment; it is an evaluation. The Cavalli-Sforzas are speaking here as moralists who seek cover for their egalitarian political views by presenting them as well-established science. Furthermore, whether any differences of temperament and intellect are related to genes cannot be settled a priori. The question is an empirical one still very much in dispute (Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Levin 1997; Rushton 1995). Hence, as the Cavalli-Sforzas are forced
to admit when they get down to particulars, “We cannot exclude the possibility that there is a genetic component to behavioral characteristics” (1995, 205), and “[t]his [environmental influence on IQ] does not mean that heredity has no bearing on intelligence quotient” (221). Here, at last, they speak in the voice of science. As moralists, the Cavalli-Sforzas have no authority. It is as scientists that they must appeal to us, but when we examine their science, we find little support for their unguarded dicta about race. On the contrary, we find evidence to refute those dicta.
The first chapter of The Great Human Diasporas has to do with Pygmies. This material is significant because it seems beyond dispute that the Pygmies constitute a distinctive race that differs from others in both genotype and phenotype. If you were looking for a prototype of the sort of breeding group that is meant by the word race, it would be difficult to find a better one than the Pygmies. How can a man who has spent much of his life studying this unique group of people, as the elder Cavalli- Sforza has, deny the reality of racial distinctions? Only, I suspect, by letting his feelings color his scientific judgment.
Is the Concept of Race Illegitimate?
MAX HOCUTT
(Max Hocutt is professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of Alabama.)
...
Cavalli-Sforza
Nearly a quarter century passed between the publication of the three essays in physical anthropology that I have just criticized and the publication of The Great Human Diasporas
by the population biologist Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza and his son Francesco (1995). Yet this recent book offers few new arguments. Instead, it repeats the old ones.
The authors begin the chapter “Race and Racism” by mentioning the evil of racism and by condemning research that they regard as racist.6 (6. Characteristically, Cavalli-Sforza uses the term loosely, describing as racist all research that draws attention to racial differences, even if its authors endorse no declaration of superiority and inferiority. Thus, Arthur Jensen’s work on IQ counts as racist by Cavalli-Sforza’s tendentious definition—a slick but not an admirable way to poison the wells of scientific research and to beg the question of whether its conclusions are sound.) They observe that race is often confused with nation or culture and complain that, given the looseness of the concept, no one can say how many races exist. They attribute the difficulty of making a count to the fact that many genetically related features of human beings vary continuously, leaving no breaks that provide clear demarcations between races.
After making these now familiar points, the Cavalli-Sforzas dilate on the difficulties that confront attempts to distinguish one race from another. They illustrate these difficulties by explaining, with a map, how interbreeding has obliterated once-obvious differences between the Etruscans who settled northern Italy and the Greek peoples who colonized the southern half of the boot. This blending of two formerly distinguishable races into one, the authors claim, shows that it never makes sense to talk of distinguishable races. Yet they also note that various European “peoples,” such as the
Basques of Spain and the Celts from Breton, differ not only culturally but also genetically (like races!). In this same “I can’t say ‘breakfast’” fashion, the Cavalli-Sforzas go on to aver that because Jews are a “heterogeneous people” from many parts of the world, there is no Jewish race. They admit, however, that “endogamy (marriage between individuals from the same group) was sufficiently widespread among the forebears of today’s Jews for them to continue to have a not insignificant level of genes in common and a certain resemblance” (236) (like members of the same race!).
Showing no awareness that they are giving back with one hand what they took with the other, the Cavalli-Sforzas go on to conclude, “The idea of race in the human species serves no purpose” (237). With the usual reflex, they attribute belief in race to the Nazi myth of racial purity and to an irrational but innate tribalism.7 (With consummate wit, a friend of mine calls this pseudoreasoning the argumentum ad nazium.) They then cite the mistreatment of Pygmies by their larger and more aggressive neighbors as a
regrettable example of our human tendency to divide the world up into them and us. Clearly, there is nothing new here, just the now-familiar arguments: that a belief in racial distinctions is wrong because it encourages racism; that no distinctions exist between races because the distinctions that do exist are not sharp and clear; that although racial differences may be real, it would be better to describe them as differences between “peoples”; that there are no races because there are no pure races; and so on. Having already refuted these arguments—or, rather, having shown how they refute themselves—I will not go over them again.
Instead, I will examine the only new argument to be found in the Cavalli-Sforza book. In the preface, the authors casually remark that racial distinctions are unimportant because they are limited to such trivial matters as skin color and bodily conformation. They return to this theme in chapter 8, claiming that although physical differences can be explained in genetic terms, no mental differences can be explained in this way. They declare, “The biological differences [between Pygmies and other groups] are obviously striking, and equally obviously superficial. . . . [T]he explanation [of the Pygmy economy] must lie in a radically different cultural legacy” (204); “[n]othing, however, is truly or solely innate in child or adult intelligence. On the contrary, intelligence is the product of personal experience, which is complex and differs from person to person” (219). Here we have one more example of faulty reasoning. Reduced to its essence, the argument is: racial distinctions are unreal because they are unimportant.8 For the sake of discussion, let us grant for the moment the premise that racial differences are superficial
and inconsequential because they are physical. Still, the conclusion—that racial differences are fictitious, imaginary, or mythical—does not follow. On the contrary, what follows is that racial differences must be real, for how else can they be trivial or superficial? The Cavalli-Sforzas have shot themselves in the foot.
Nor is that the worst of it: the gun was illegally obtained. That a certain difference between persons is unimportant is not a scientific judgment; it is an evaluation. The Cavalli-Sforzas are speaking here as moralists who seek cover for their egalitarian political views by presenting them as well-established science. Furthermore, whether any differences of temperament and intellect are related to genes cannot be settled a priori. The question is an empirical one still very much in dispute (Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Levin 1997; Rushton 1995). Hence, as the Cavalli-Sforzas are forced
to admit when they get down to particulars, “We cannot exclude the possibility that there is a genetic component to behavioral characteristics” (1995, 205), and “[t]his [environmental influence on IQ] does not mean that heredity has no bearing on intelligence quotient” (221). Here, at last, they speak in the voice of science. As moralists, the Cavalli-Sforzas have no authority. It is as scientists that they must appeal to us, but when we examine their science, we find little support for their unguarded dicta about race. On the contrary, we find evidence to refute those dicta.
The first chapter of The Great Human Diasporas has to do with Pygmies. This material is significant because it seems beyond dispute that the Pygmies constitute a distinctive race that differs from others in both genotype and phenotype. If you were looking for a prototype of the sort of breeding group that is meant by the word race, it would be difficult to find a better one than the Pygmies. How can a man who has spent much of his life studying this unique group of people, as the elder Cavalli- Sforza has, deny the reality of racial distinctions? Only, I suspect, by letting his feelings color his scientific judgment.