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Old October 25th, 2008 #3
F.W. Braun
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Note that asshole lazer uses the Jew cuss word "nazis." Shouldn't he be posting on the Jew-fronted The New Republic or Little Green Footballs?

You have things ass backward and you obviously haven't done your homework (and I won't do it for you here). Anglo-Americans weren't any better in their treatment of Germans than were Russians, often they were worse. At least the Russians weren't in the habit of making souvenirs out of the bones of their enemies.

http://www.codoh.com/atro/atrocity.html

The following is part of Chapter V: “In Yahweh We Trust: A Divine Foreign Policy” from Dr. Tom Sunic’s book: Homo americanus; Child of the Postmodern Age (2007) .


Similar discriminatory acts against ideological opponents were reserved for Germany during and after World War II. Whereas everybody in American and European postmodern political establishment are obliged to know by heart the body count of Fascist and National Socialist victims, nobody still knows the exact number of Germans killed by American forces during and after World War II. Worse, as noted earlier, a different perspective in describing the US post-war foreign policy toward Europe and Germany is not considered politically correct. After the ill-fated American military excursion into Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent media coverage of American crimes committed there, the question in retrospect needs to be raised as to the behavior of the American military in Germany in 1945 and after. The American mistreatment of German POWs and civilians during World War II must have been far worse than that in Iraq after 2003.

Just as communism, following the Second World War, used large scale terror in the implementation of its foreign policy goals in Eastern Europe, so did America use its own type of repression to silence heretics in the occupied parts of postwar-Europe. Purges carried out by the American military authorities in postwar Germany remain an uneasy topic for many official American historians who mostly study the Allied version of war events. Many European conservative scholars have also been unable to comprehend sudden shifts in American political behavior, because many have traditionally assumed that America is a cultural and spiritual extension of Europe. American political behavior in war ravaged Europe could only be understood and judged within America’s own judgmental parameters. Using classical European value judgments regarding the notion of limited vs. unlimited warfare, yields different results that are often rejected by American elites.

The American crusade to extirpate evil was felt by Germans in full force in the aftermath of World War II. Freda Utley, an English-American writer depicts graphically in her books the barbaric methods applied by American military authorities against German civilians and prisoners in war ravaged Germany. Although Utley enjoyed popularity among American conservatives, her name and her works fell quickly into oblivion. Nonetheless, it is worth reminding that when an American author of her stature writes about American war crimes in Europe, she or he will naturally elicit more credibility than when a German or a French historian writes about the same topic. Utley’s book throws additional light on the other side of America’s much vaunted humaneness. In hindsight one wonders whether there was any substantive difference between warmongering Americanism and Communism? If one takes into account the behavior of American military authorities in Germany after World War II, it becomes clear why American elites, half a century later, were unwilling to initiate the process of decommunisation in Eastern Europe, as well as the process of demarxisation in American and European higher education. After all, were not Roosevelt and Stalin war time allies? Were not American and Soviet soldiers fighting the same “Nazi evil”?

It was the inhumane behavior of the American military interrogators that left deep scars on the German psyche and which explains why Germans, and by extension all Europeans, act today in foreign affairs like scared lackeys of American geopolitical interests.

A thoughtful American professor, whom I met in Heidelberg, expressed the opinion that the United States military authorities on entering Germany and seeing the ghastly destruction wrought by our obliteration bombing were fearful that knowledge of it would cause a revulsion of opinion in America and might prevent the carrying out of Washington’s policy for Germany by awakening sympathy for the defeated and realization of our war crimes. This, he believes, is the reason why a whole fleet of aircraft was used by General Eisenhower to bring journalists, Congressmen, and churchmen to see the concentration camps; the idea being that the sight of Hitler’s starved victims would obliterate consciousness of our own guilt. Certainly it worked out that way. No American newspaper of large circulation in those days wrote up the horror of our bombing or described the ghastly conditions in which the survivors were living in the corpse-filled ruins. American readers sipped their fill only of German atrocities.

Utley’s work is today unknown in American higher education although her prose constitutes a valuable document in studying the crusading and inquisitorial character of Americanism in Europe. There are legions of similar revisionist books on the topic describing the plight of Germans and Europeans after the Second World War, but due to academic silence and self-censorship of many scholars, these books do not reach mainstream professional and academic circles. Moreover, both American and European historians still seem to be light years away from historicizing contemporary history and its aftermath. This is understandable, in view of the fact that acting and writing otherwise would throw an ugly light on crimes committed by the Americans in Germany during and after the Second World War and would substantially ruin anti-fascist victimology, including the Holocaust narrative.

American crimes in Europe, committed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, included extra-legal killings of countless German civilians and disarmed soldiers, while tacitly approving serial Soviet genocides and mass expulsions of the German civilian population in Eastern Europe. As Utley notes, the sheer sight of the horror and destruction which American warplanes had inflicted on German towns and cities, from the psychological point of view, must have prompted the American military authorities and subsequent American administrations, academics, journalists, historians, and opinion makers to cover up America’s own misdeeds. Consequently, a whole new industry of story telling regarding real or alleged National Socialist crimes was established in the West. As years and decades went by, crimes committed by the Americans against Germans were either whitewashed or ascribed to the defeated Germans. Utley describes in detail how thousands of German captives, before being dispatched to the gallows, were molested by the American interrogators. Charges filed against them were based on flimsy evidence, with no chance for a suspect of standing a fair trial.

The exact number of German casualties during and after the Second World War remains unknown. The number of German dead varies wildly, ranging from 6 to 16 million Germans, including civilians and soldiers. The official American hesitancy to establish the precise number of German war losses is understandable, as this is a topic that American court historians do not find compatible with the spirit of Americanism. It is only the fascist criminology of World War II, along with the rhetorical projection of the evil side of the Holocaust that modern historiographers like to repeat, with Jewish American historians and commentators being at the helm of this narrative. Other victimhoods and other victimologies, notably those of people who suffered under communism, are rarely mentioned. Although Germany was the direct party involved in the war, the entire European continent was affected by the American military victory. The American supreme military headquarters, under the general Dwight Eisenhower, withdrew after May 8, 1945, the POW status to German soldiers who had earlier been taken prisoners. According to some German historians over a million and a half German soldiers died after the end of hostilities in American and Soviet-run prison camps.

Political events in America and Europe since 1945 bear a strong mark of the Manichean approach in American foreign policy and hark back to the struggle which pitted the nations of European ancestry against other European nations, albeit with three radically different world views. There is a large and impressive “un-American” revisionist legacy in America depicting various aspects of American foreign policy during and after the Second World War. These revisionist scholars do not shy away from describing the plight of Germans and other Europeans at the hand of their American victors. However, their prose, although having legally a right of entry in America, has not had to date much of an impact on public consciousness and political decision making. The answer is not difficult to guess. The masters of discourse in postmodern America have powerful means to decide the meaning of the historical truth and provide the meaning with their own historical context. Mentioning extensively Germany’s war losses runs the risk of eclipsing the scope of Jewish war looses, which makes many Jewish intellectuals exceedingly nervous. Every nation likes to see its own sacred victimhood on the top of the list of global suffering. Moreover, if critical revisionist literature were ever to gain a mainstream foothold in America and Europe, it would render a serious blow to the ideology of Americanism and would dramatically change the course of history in the coming decades. Having this in mind, America’s former foes, Japan and Germany, as well as other European countries, must continue to toe the line of American “cognitive warfare” in postmodernity.

How three million Germans died after VE Day

Nigel Jones reviews After the Reich: From the Liberation of Vienna to the Berlin Airlift by Giles MacDonogh

Giles MacDonogh is a bon viveur and a historian of wine and gastronomy, but in this book, pursuing his other consuming interest - German history - he serves a dish to turn the strongest of stomachs. It makes particularly uncomfortable reading for those who compare the disastrous occupation of Iraq unfavourably to the post-war settlement of Germany and Austria.

MacDonogh argues that the months that followed May 1945 brought no peace to the shattered skeleton of Hitler’s Reich, but suffering even worse than the destruction wrought by the war. After the atrocities that the Nazis had visited on Europe, some degree of justified vengeance by their victims was inevitable, but the appalling bestialities that MacDonogh documents so soberly went far beyond that. The first 200 pages of his brave book are an almost unbearable chronicle of human suffering.

His best estimate is that some three million Germans died unnecessarily after the official end of hostilities. A million soldiers vanished before they could creep back to the holes that had been their homes. The majority of them died in Soviet captivity (of the 90,000 who surrendered at Stalingrad, only 5,000 eventually came home) but, shamingly, many thousands perished as prisoners of the Anglo-Americans. Herded into cages along the Rhine, with no shelter and very little food, they dropped like flies. Others, more fortunate, toiled as slave labour in a score of Allied countries, often for years. Incredibly, some Germans were still being held in Russia as late as 1979.

The two million German civilians who died were largely the old, women and children: victims of disease, cold, hunger, suicide - and mass murder.

Apart from the well-known repeated rape of virtually every girl and woman unlucky enough to be in the Soviet occupation zones, perhaps the most shocking outrage recorded by MacDonogh - for the first time in English - is the slaughter of a quarter of a million Sudeten Germans by their vengeful Czech compatriots. The survivors of this ethnic cleansing, naked and shivering, were pitched across the border, never to return to their homes. Similar scenes were seen across Poland, Silesia and East Prussia as age-old German communities were brutally expunged.

Given that what amounted to a lesser Holocaust was unfolding under their noses, it may be asked why the western Allies did not stop this venting of long-dammed-up rage on the (mainly) innocent. MacDonogh’s answer is that it could all have been even worse. The US Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, favoured turning Germany into a gigantic farm, and there were genocidal Nazi-like schemes afoot to starve, sterilise or deport the population of what was left of the bombed-out cities.

The discovery of the Nazi death camps stoked Allied fury [i.e., Allied propaganda as an excuse to commit a real genocide against the German population], with General George Patton asking an aide amid the horrors of Buchenwald: ‘Do you still find it hard to hate them?’ But the surviving inmates were soon replaced by German captives - Dachau, Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen and even Auschwitz stayed in business after the war, only now with the Germans behind the wire.

It was Realpolitik, not humanitarian concern, that caused a swift shift in western attitudes towards their former foes. Fear of Communism spreading into the heart of Europe, and the barbarities of the Russians - who kidnapped and killed hundreds of their perceived enemies from the western zones of Berlin and Vienna - belatedly made the West realise that they had beaten one totalitarian power only to be threatened by another.

Even that hardline Kraut-hater Patton was sacked for advocating a pre-emptive strike against Russia. Building up West Germany and saving Berlin from Soviet strangulation with the 1948 airlift became the first battles of the Cold War - even if that meant overlooking Nazi crimes and enlisting Nazi criminals in the ‘economic miracle’ of reconstruction.

Although MacDonogh roundly condemns all the occupying powers, the British emerge with some credit. Apart from one Air Marshal who looted art treasures; and an MI5 interrogator nicknamed ‘Tin Eye’ Stephens who ran a private torture chamber, British hands may have been grubby, but were not deeply blood-stained. British squaddies preferred to purchase their sex privately with a packet of fags or a pair of nylons, rather than in the Soviet style.

MacDonogh has written a gruelling but important book. This unhappy story has long been cloaked in silence since telling it suited no one. Not the Allies, because it placed them near the moral nadir of the Nazis; nor the Germans, because they did not wish to be accused of whitewashing Hitler by highlighting what was, by any standard, a war crime. Giles MacDonogh has told a very inconvenient truth.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/arts/main...15/bomac14.xml

As to Germans in Soviet Russia, it was precisely the ruthless methods employed by Judaised partisans that forced Germans to retaliate against them and the people who were aiding and abetting their actions. There was nothing in international law that proscribed such measures and they were the norm in European warfare for centuries (the Soviets didn't sign the Geneva Convention either).

Asshole lazer obviously hasn't bothered reading:

Joachim Hoffmann, Stalin’s War of Extermination 1941-1945. Planning, Realization, Documentation.

Franz W. Seidler, Crimes Against the Wehrmacht (2. vols.)

Walter Post, The Defamed Wehrmacht.

Quote:
Originally Posted by lazer View Post
I'm pretty sure you had some loose fucking scumbags among the allied forces(IE; US, Britain, Canada), but its not like they mass murdered the Germans. I know the most atrocities were commited by the russians. Above all it's a fact to mention that Germans, even though they just used the Americans were far better off with them then with the communists. But it's not like the germans were nice against the russians either. You have to realize millions of slavs or russians were murdered in that blitzkrieg campaign that was unleashed by the nazis, but they were stupid the nazi high command, because the soldiers duty is to fight the enemy militairy wise and not go wiping out entire villages. It created those pain in the ass partisans in the first place. Thats why the germans couldnt keep it up either in the ostfront because their logistics were constantly disrupted by millions of these young partisans who probably lost entire generations of family members in the hands of German soldiers. I sincerely think the Germans could have defeated the Soviet armies faster and easier if it wasnt for people who thought they could play general. The Germans could've won the heart and minds of the people who suffered from Stalin and whatnot. I'm not saying the rapes and murders of millions of German people were of the result of German massmurdering of russians but it shouldn't have happened if there werent poor decision making by the nazis, im thinking in the militairy broader side.