|April 28th, 2013||#1|
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#1 Winston Churchill Thread: The Opportunist of the Millenium
by Ralph Raico
Churchill as Icon
When, in a very few years, the pundits start to pontificate on the great question: "Who was the Man of the Century?" there is little doubt that they will reach virtually instant consensus. Inevitably, the answer will be: Winston Churchill. Indeed, Professor Harry Jaffa has already informed us that Churchill was not only the Man of the Twentieth Century, but the Man of Many Centuries.
In a way, Churchill as Man of the Century will be appropriate. This has been the century of the State of the rise and hyper-trophic growth of the welfare-warfare state and Churchill was from first to last a Man of the State, of the welfare state and of the warfare state. War, of course, was his lifelong passion; and, as an admiring historian has written: "Among his other claims to fame, Winston Churchill ranks as one of the founders of the welfare state." Thus, while Churchill never had a principle he did not in the end betray, this does not mean that there was no slant to his actions, no systematic bias. There was, and that bias was towards lowering the barriers to state power.
To gain any understanding of Churchill, we must go beyond the heroic images propagated for over half a century. The conventional picture of Churchill, especially of his role in World War II, was first of all the work of Churchill himself, through the distorted histories he composed and rushed into print as soon as the war was over. In more recent decades, the Churchill legend has been adopted by an internationalist establishment for which it furnishes the perfect symbol and an inexhaustible vein of high-toned blather. Churchill has become, in Christopher Hitchens's phrase, a "totem" of the American establishment, not only the scions of the New Deal, but the neo-conservative apparatus as well politicians like Newt Gingrich and Dan Quayle, corporate "knights" and other denizens of the Reagan and Bush Cabinets, the editors and writers of the Wall Street Journal, and a legion of "conservative" columnists led by William Safire and William Buckley. Churchill was, as Hitchens writes, "the human bridge across which the transition was made" between a noninterventionist and a globalist America. In the next century, it is not impossible that his bulldog likeness will feature in the logo of the New World Order.
Let it be freely conceded that in 1940 Churchill played his role superbly. As the military historian, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, a sharp critic of Churchill's wartime policies, wrote: "Churchill was a man cast in the heroic mould, a berserker ever ready to lead a forlorn hope or storm a breach, and at his best when things were at their worst. His glamorous rhetoric, his pugnacity, and his insistence on annihilating the enemy appealed to human instincts, and made him an outstanding war leader." History outdid herself when she cast Churchill as the adversary in the duel with Hitler. It matters not at all that in his most famous speech "we shall fight them on the beaches . . . we shall fight them in the fields and in the streets" he plagiarized Clemenceau at the time of the Ludendorff offensive that there was little real threat of a German invasion or, that, perhaps, there was no reason for the duel to have occurred in the first place. For a few months in 1940, Churchill played his part magnificently and unforgettably.
Opportunism and Rhetoric
Yet before 1940, the word most closely associated with Churchill was "opportunist." He had twice changed his party affiliation from Conservative to Liberal, and then back again. His move to the Liberals was allegedly on the issue of free trade. But in 1930, he sold out on free trade as well, even tariffs on food, and proclaimed that he had cast off "Cobdenism" forever. As head of the Board of Trade before World War I, he opposed increased armaments; after he became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, he pushed for bigger and bigger budgets, spreading wild rumors of the growing strength of the German Navy, just as he did in the 1930s about the buildup of the German Air Force. He attacked socialism before and after World War I, while during the War he promoted war-socialism, calling for nationalization of the railroads, and declaring in a speech: "Our whole nation must be organized, must be socialized if you like the word." Churchill's opportunism continued to the end. In the 1945 election, he briefly latched on to Hayek's Road to Serfdom, and tried to paint the Labour Party as totalitarian, while it was Churchill himself who, in 1943, had accepted the Beveridge plans for the post-war welfare state and Keynesian management of the economy. Throughout his career his one guiding rule was to climb to power and stay there.
There were two principles that for a long while seemed dear to Churchill's heart. One was anti-Communism: he was an early and fervent opponent of Bolshevism. For years, he very correctly decried the "bloody baboons" and "foul murderers of Moscow." His deep early admiration of Benito Mussolini was rooted in his shrewd appreciation of what Mussolini had accomplished (or so he thought). In an Italy teetering on the brink of Leninist revolution, Il Duce had discovered the one formula that could counteract the Leninist appeal: hyper-nationalism with a social slant. Churchill lauded "Fascismo's triumphant struggle against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism," claiming that "it proved the necessary antidote to the Communist poison."
Yet the time came when Churchill made his peace with Communism. In 1941, he gave unconditional support to Stalin, welcomed him as an ally, embraced him as a friend. Churchill, as well as Roosevelt, used the affectionate nickname, "Uncle Joe"; as late as the Potsdam conference, he repeatedly announced, of Stalin: "I like that man." In suppressing the evidence that the Polish officers at Katyn had been murdered by the Soviets, he remarked: "There is no use prowling round the three year old graves of Smolensk." Obsessed not only with defeating Hitler, but with destroying Germany, Churchill was oblivious to the danger of a Soviet inundation of Europe until it was far too late. The climax of his infatuation came at the November, 1943, Tehran conference, when Churchill presented Stalin with a Crusader's sword. Those who are concerned to define the word "obscenity" may wish to ponder that episode.
Finally, there was what appeared to be the abiding love of his life, the British Empire. If Churchill stood for anything at all, it was the Empire; he famously said that he had not become Prime Minister in order to preside over its liquidation. But that, of course, is precisely what he did, selling out the Empire and everything else for the sake of total victory over Germany.
Besides his opportunism, Churchill was noted for his remarkable rhetorical skill. This talent helped him wield power over men, but it pointed to a fateful failing as well. Throughout his life, many who observed Churchill closely noted a peculiar trait. In 1917, Lord Esher described it in this way:
But while Winston had no principles, there was one constant in his life: the love of war. It began early. As a child, he had a huge collection of toy soldiers, 1500 of them, and he played with them for many years after most boys turn to other things. They were "all British," he tells us, and he fought battles with his brother Jack, who "was only allowed to have colored troops; and they were not allowed to have artillery." He attended Sandhurst, the military academy, instead of the universities, and "from the moment that Churchill left Sandhurst . . . he did his utmost to get into a fight, wherever a war was going on." All his life he was most excited on the evidence, only really excited by war. He loved war as few modern men ever have he even "loved the bangs," as he called them, and he was very brave under fire.
In 1925, Churchill wrote: "The story of the human race is war." This, however, is untrue; potentially, it is disastrously untrue. Churchill lacked any grasp of the fundamentals of the social philosophy of classical liberalism. In particular, he never understood that, as Ludwig von Mises explained, the true story of the human race is the extension of social cooperation and the division of labor. Peace, not war, is the father of all things. For Churchill, the years without war offered nothing to him but "the bland skies of peace and platitude." This was a man, as we shall see, who wished for more wars than actually happened.
When he was posted to India and began to read avidly, to make up for lost time, Churchill was profoundly impressed by Darwinism. He lost whatever religious faith he may have had through reading Gibbon, he said and took a particular dislike, for some reason, to the Catholic Church, as well as Christian missions. He became, in his own words, "a materialist to the tips of my fingers," and he fervently upheld the worldview that human life is a struggle for existence, with the outcome the survival of the fittest. This philosophy of life and history Churchill expressed in his one novel, Savrola. That Churchill was a racist goes without saying, yet his racism went deeper than with most of his contemporaries. It is curious how, with his stark Darwinian outlook, his elevation of war to the central place in human history, and his racism, as well as his fixation on "great leaders," Churchill's worldview resembled that of his antagonist, Hitler.
When Churchill was not actually engaged in war, he was reporting on it. He early made a reputation for himself as a war correspondent, in Kitchener's campaign in the Sudan and in the Boer War. In December, 1900, a dinner was given at the Waldorf-Astoria in honor of the young journalist, recently returned from his well-publicized adventures in South Africa. Mark Twain, who introduced him, had already, it seems, caught on to Churchill. In a brief satirical speech, Twain slyly suggested that, with his English father and American mother, Churchill was the perfect representative of Anglo-American cant.
Churchill and the "New Liberalism"
In 1900 Churchill began the career he was evidently fated for. His background as the grandson of a duke and son of a famous Tory politician got him into the House of Commons as a Conservative. At first he seemed to be distinguished only by his restless ambition, remarkable even in parliamentary ranks. But in 1904, he crossed the floor to the Liberals, supposedly on account of his free-trade convictions. However, Robert Rhodes James, one of Churchill's admirers, wrote: "It was believed [at the time], probably rightly, that if Arthur Balfour had given him office in 1902, Churchill would not have developed such a burning interest in free trade and joined the Liberals." Clive Ponting notes that: "as he had already admitted to Rosebery, he was looking for an excuse to defect from a party that seemed reluctant to recognise his talents," and the Liberals would not accept a protectionist.
Tossed by the tides of faddish opinion, with no principles of his own and hungry for power, Churchill soon became an adherent of the "New Liberalism," an updated version of his father's "Tory Democracy." The "new" liberalism differed from the "old" only in the small matter of substituting incessant state activism for laissez-faire.
Although his conservative idolators seem blithely unaware of the fact – for them it is always 1940 – Churchill was one of the chief architects of the welfare state in Britain. The modern welfare state, successor to the welfare state of 18th-century absolutism, began in the 1880s in Germany, under Bismarck. In England, the legislative turning point came when Asquith succeeded Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minister in 1908; his reorganized cabinet included David Lloyd George at the Exchequer and Churchill at the Board of Trade.
Of course, "the electoral dimension of social policy was well to the fore in Churchill's thinking," writes a sympathetic historian meaning that Churchill understood it as the way to win votes. He wrote to a friend:
Following a visit to Germany, Lloyd George and Churchill were both converted to the Bismarckian model of social insurance schemes. As Churchill told his constituents: "My heart was filled with admiration of the patient genius which had added these social bulwarks to the many glories of the German race." He set out, in his words, to "thrust a big slice of Bismarckianism over the whole underside of our industrial system." In 1908, Churchill announced in a speech in Dundee: "I am on the side of those who think that a greater collective sentiment should be introduced into the State and the municipalities. I should like to see the State undertaking new functions." Still, individualism must be respected: "No man can be a collectivist alone or an individualist alone. He must be both an individualist and a collectivist. The nature of man is a dual nature. The character of the organisation of human society is dual." This, by the way, is a good sample of Churchill as political philosopher: it never gets much better.
But while both "collective organisation" and "individual incentive" must be given their due, Churchill was certain which had gained the upper hand:
At this time, Churchill fell under the influence of Beatrice and Sidney Webb, the leaders of the Fabian Society. At one of her famous strategic dinner parties, Beatrice Webb introduced Churchill to a young protégé, William later Lord Beveridge. Churchill brought Beveridge into the Board of Trade as his advisor on social questions, thus starting him on his illustrious career. Besides pushing for a variety of social insurance schemes, Churchill created the system of national labor exchanges: he wrote to Prime Minister Asquith of the need to "spread . . . a sort of Germanized network of state intervention and regulation" over the British labor market. But Churchill entertained much more ambitious goals for the Board of Trade. He proposed a plan whereby:
World War I
In 1911, Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty, and now was truly in his element. Naturally, he quickly allied himself with the war party, and, during the crises that followed, fanned the flames of war. When the final crisis came, in the summer of 1914, Churchill was the only member of the cabinet who backed war from the start, with all of his accustomed energy. Asquith, his own Prime Minister, wrote of him: "Winston very bellicose and demanding immediate mobilization. . . . Winston, who has got all his war paint on, is longing for a sea fight in the early hours of the morning to result in the sinking of the Goeben. The whole thing fills me with sadness."
On the afternoon of July 28, three days before the German invasion of Belgium, he mobilized the British Home Fleet, the greatest assemblage of naval power in the history of the world to that time. As Sidney Fay wrote, Churchill ordered that:
From the outset of hostilities, Churchill, as head of the Admiralty, was instrumental in establishing the hunger blockade of Germany. This was probably the most effective weapon employed on either side in the whole conflict. The only problem was that, according to everyone's interpretation of international law except Britain's, it was illegal. The blockade was not "close-in," but depended on scattering mines, and many of the goods deemed contraband for instance, food for civilians had never been so classified before. But, throughout his career, international law and the conventions by which men have tried to limit the horrors of war meant nothing to Churchill. As a German historian has dryly commented, Churchill was ready to break the rules whenever the very existence of his country was at stake, and "for him this was very often the case."
The hunger blockade had certain rather unpleasant consequences. About 750,000 German civilians succumbed to hunger and diseases caused by malnutrition. The effect on those who survived was perhaps just as frightful in its own way. A historian of the blockade concluded: "the victimized youth [of World War I] were to become the most radical adherents of National Socialism." It was also complications arising from the British blockade that eventually provided the pretext for Wilson's decision to go to war in 1917.
Whether Churchill actually arranged for the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915, is still unclear. A week before the disaster, he wrote to Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade that it was "most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores, in the hopes especially of embroiling the United States with Germany." Many highly-placed persons in Britain and America believed that the German sinking of the Lusitania would bring the United States into the war.
The most recent student of the subject is Patrick Beesly, whose Room 40 is a history of British Naval Intelligence in World War I. Beesly's careful account is all the more persuasive for going against the grain of his own sentiments. He points out that the British Admiralty was aware that German U-boat Command had informed U-boat captains at sea of the sailings of the Lusitania, and that the U-boat responsible for the sinking of two ships in recent days was present in the vicinity of Queenstown, off the southern coast of Ireland, in the path the Lusitania was scheduled to take. There is no surviving record of any specific warning to the Lusitania. No destroyer escort was sent to accompany the ship to port, nor were any of the readily available destroyers instructed to hunt for the submarine. In fact, "no effective steps were taken to protect the Lusitania." Beesly concludes:
In the midst of bloody conflict, Churchill was energy personified, the source of one brainstorm after another. Sometimes his hunches worked out well – he was the chief promoter of the tank in World War I – sometimes not so well, as at Gallipoli. The notoriety of that disaster, which blackened his name for years, caused him to be temporarily dropped from the Cabinet in 1915. His reaction was typical: To one visitor, he said, pointing to the maps on the wall: "This is what I live for . . . Yes, I am finished in respect of all I care for the waging of war, the defeat of the Germans."
Between the Wars
For the next few years, Churchill was shuttled from one ministerial post to another. As Minister of War, of Churchill in this position one may say what the revisionist historian Charles Tansill said of Henry Stimson as Secretary of War: no one ever deserved the title more. Churchill promoted a crusade to crush Bolshevism in Russia. As Colonial Secretary, he was ready to involve Britain in war with Turkey over the Chanak incident, but the British envoy to Turkey did not deliver Churchill's ultimatum, and in the end cooler heads prevailed.
In 1924, Churchill rejoined the Conservatives and was made Chancellor of the Exchequer. His father, in the same office, was noted for having been puzzled by the decimals: what were "those damned dots"? Winston's most famous act was to return Britain to the gold standard at the unrealistic pre-war parity, thus severely damaging the export trade and ruining the good name of gold, as was pointed out by Murray N. Rothbard. Hardly anyone today would disagree with the judgment of A.J.P. Taylor: Churchill "did not grasp the economic arguments one way or the other. What determined him was again a devotion to British greatness. The pound would once more 'look the dollar in the face'; the days of Queen Victoria would be restored."
So far Churchill had been engaged in politics for 30 years, with not much to show for it except a certain notoriety. His great claim to fame in the modern mythology begins with his hard line against Hitler in the 1930s. But it is important to realize that Churchill had maintained a hard line against Weimar Germany, as well. He denounced all calls for Allied disarmament, even before Hitler came to power. Like other Allied leaders, Churchill was living a protracted fantasy: that Germany would submit forever to what it viewed as the shackles of Versailles. In the end, what Britain and France refused to grant to a democratic Germany they were forced to concede to Hitler. Moreover, if most did not bother to listen when Churchill fulminated on the impending German threat, they had good reason. He had tried to whip up hysteria too often before: for a crusade against Bolshevik Russia, during the General Strike of 1926, on the mortal dangers of Indian independence, in the abdication crisis. Why pay any heed to his latest delusion?
Churchill had been a strong Zionist practically from the start, holding that Zionism would deflect European Jews from social revolution to partnership with European imperialism in the Arab world. Now, in 1936, he forged links with the informal London pressure group known as The Focus, whose purpose was to open the eyes of the British public to the one great menace, Nazi Germany. "The great bulk of its finance came from rich British Jews such as Sir Robert Mond (a director of several chemical firms) and Sir Robert Waley-Cohn, the managing director of Shell, the latter contributing £50,000." The Focus was to be useful in expanding Churchill's network of contacts and in pushing for his entry into the Cabinet.
Though a Conservative MP, Churchill began berating the Conservative governments, first Baldwin's and then Chamberlain's, for their alleged blindness to the Nazi threat. He vastly exaggerated the extent of German rearmament, formidable as it was, and distorted its purpose by harping on German production of heavy-bombers. This was never a German priority, and Churchill's fabrications were meant to demonstrate a German design to attack Britain, which was never Hitler's intention. At this time, Churchill busily promoted the Grand Alliance that was to include Britain, France, Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Since the Poles, having nearly been conquered by the Red Army in 1920, rejected any coalition with the Soviet Union, and since the Soviets' only access to Germany was through Poland, Churchill's plan was worthless.
Ironically considering that it was a pillar of his future fame his drumbeating about the German danger was yet another position on which Churchill reneged. In the fall of 1937, he stated:
The common mythology is so far from historical truth that even an ardent Churchill sympathizer, Gordon Craig, feels obliged to write:
In September, 1939, Britain went to war with Germany, pursuant to the guarantee which Chamberlain had been panicked into extending to Poland in March. Lloyd George had termed the guarantee "hare-brained," while Churchill had supported it. Nonetheless, in his history of the war Churchill wrote: "Here was decision at last, taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground which must surely lead to the slaughter of tens of millions of people." With the war on, Winston was recalled to his old job as First Lord of the Admiralty. Then, in the first month of the war, an astonishing thing happened: the President of the United States initiated a personal correspondence not with the Prime Minister, but with the head of the British Admiralty, by-passing all the ordinary diplomatic channels.
The messages that passed between the President and the First Lord were surrounded by a frantic secrecy, culminating in the affair of Tyler Kent, the American cipher clerk at the U.S. London embassy who was tried and imprisoned by the British authorities. The problem was that some of the messages contained allusions to Roosevelt's agreement even before the war began to a blatantly unneutral cooperation with a belligerent Britain.
On June 10, 1939, George VI and his wife, Queen Mary, visited the Roosevelts at Hyde Park. In private conversations with the King, Roosevelt promised full support for Britain in case of war. He intended to set up a zone in the Atlantic to be patrolled by the U.S. Navy, and, according to the King's notes, the President stated that "if he saw a U boat he would sink her at once & wait for the consequences." The biographer of George VI, Wheeler-Bennett, considered that these conversations "contained the germ of the future Bases-for-Destroyers deal, and also of the Lend-Lease Agreement itself." In communicating with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Roosevelt was aware that he was in touch with the one member of Chamberlain's cabinet whose belligerence matched his own.
In 1940, Churchill at last became Prime Minister, ironically enough when the Chamberlain government resigned because of the Norwegian fiasco which Churchill, more than anyone else, had helped to bring about. As he had fought against a negotiated peace after the fall of Poland, so he continued to resist any suggestion of negotiations with Hitler. Many of the relevant documents are still sealed after all these years but it is clear that a strong peace party existed in the country and the government. It included Lloyd George in the House of Commons, and Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, in the Cabinet. Even after the fall of France, Churchill rejected Hitler's renewed peace overtures. This, more than anything else, is supposed to be the foundation of his greatness. The British historian John Charmley raised a storm of outraged protest when he suggested that a negotiated peace in 1940 might have been to the advantage of Britain and Europe. A Yale historian, writing in the New York Times Book Review, referred to Charmley's thesis as "morally sickening." Yet Charmley's scholarly and detailed work makes the crucial point that Churchill's adamant refusal even to listen to peace terms in 1940 doomed what he claimed was dearest to him – the Empire and a Britain that was non-socialist and independent in world affairs. One may add that it probably also doomed European Jewry. It is amazing that half a century after the fact, there are critical theses concerning World War II that are off-limits to historical debate.
Lloyd George, Halifax, and the others were open to a compromise peace because they understood that Britain and the Dominions alone could not defeat Germany. After the fall of France, Churchill's aim of total victory could be realized only under one condition: that the United States become embroiled in another world war. No wonder that Churchill put his heart and soul into ensuring precisely that.
After a talk with Churchill, Joseph Kennedy, American ambassador to Britain, noted: "Every hour will be spent by the British in trying to figure out how we can be gotten in." When he left from Lisbon on a ship to New York, Kennedy pleaded with the State Department to announce that if the ship should happen to blow up mysteriously in the mid-Atlantic, the United States would not consider it a cause for war with Germany. In his unpublished memoirs, Kennedy wrote: "I thought that would give me some protection against Churchill's placing a bomb on the ship."
Kennedy's fears were perhaps not exaggerated. For, while it had been important for British policy in World War I, involving America was the sine qua non of Churchill's policy in World War II. In Franklin Roosevelt, he found a ready accomplice.
That Roosevelt, through his actions and private words, evinced a clear design for war before December 7, 1941, has never really been in dispute. Arguments have raged over such questions as his possible foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. In 1948, Thomas A. Bailey, diplomatic historian at Stanford, already put the real pro-Roosevelt case:
Churchill even had a hand in the barrage of pro-British, anti-German propaganda that issued from Hollywood in the years before the United States entered the war. Gore Vidal, in Screening History, perceptively notes that starting around 1937, Americans were subjected to one film after another glorifying England and the warrior heroes who built the Empire. As spectators of these productions, Vidal says: "We served neither Lincoln nor Jefferson Davis; we served the Crown." A key Hollywood figure in generating the movies that "were making us all weirdly English" was the Hungarian émigré and friend of Churchill, Alexander Korda. Vidal very aptly writes:
But Churchill did not neglect the "back door to war," embroiling the United States with Japan as a way of bringing America into the conflict with Hitler. Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador to Tokyo, like the American ambassador Joseph Grew, was working feverishly to avoid war. Churchill directed his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, to whip Craigie into line:
Churchill's devotees by no means hold his role in bringing America into World War II against him. On the contrary, they count it in his favor. Harry Jaffa, in his uninformed and frantic apology, seems to be the last person alive who refuses to believe that the Man of Many Centuries was responsible to any degree for America's entry into the war: after all, wasn't it the Japanese who bombed Pearl Harbor?
But what of the American Republic? What does it mean for us that a President collaborated with a foreign head of government to entangle us in a world war? The question would have mattered little to Churchill. He had no concern with the United States as a sovereign, independent nation, with its own character and place in the scheme of things. For him, Americans were one of "the English-speaking peoples." He looked forward to a common citizenship for Britons and Americans, a "mixing together," on the road to Anglo-American world hegemony.
But the Churchill-Roosevelt intrigue should, one might think, matter to Americans. Here, however, criticism is halted before it starts. A moral postulate of our time is that in pursuit of the destruction of Hitler, all things were permissible. Yet why is it self-evident that morality required a crusade against Hitler in 1939 and 1940, and not against Stalin? At that point, Hitler had slain his thousands, but Stalin had already slain his millions. In fact, up to June, 1941, the Soviets behaved far more murderously toward the Poles in their zone of occupation than the Nazis did in theirs. Around 1,500,000 Poles were deported to the Gulag, with about half of them dying within the first two years. As Norman Davies writes: "Stalin was outpacing Hitler in his desire to reduce the Poles to the condition of a slave nation." Of course, there were balance-of-power considerations that created distinctions between the two dictators. But it has yet to be explained why there should exist a double standard ordaining that compromise with one dictator would have been "morally sickening," while collaboration with the other was morally irreproachable.
"First Catch Your Hare"
Early in the war, Churchill, declared: "I have only one aim in life, the defeat of Hitler, and this makes things very simple for me." "Victory, victory at all costs," understood literally, was his policy practically to the end. This points to Churchill's fundamental and fatal mistake in World War II: his separation of operational from political strategy. To the first the planning and direction of military campaigns he devoted all of his time and energy; after all, he did so enjoy it. To the second, the fitting of military operations to the larger and much more significant political aims they were supposed to serve, he devoted no effort at all.
Stalin, on the other hand, understood perfectly that the entire purpose of war is to enforce certain political claims. This is the meaning of Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. On Eden's visit to Moscow in December, 1941, with the Wehrmacht in the Moscow suburbs, Stalin was ready with his demands: British recognition of Soviet rule over the Baltic states and the territories he had just seized from Finland, Poland, and Romania. (They were eventually granted.) Throughout the war he never lost sight of these and other crucial political goals. But Churchill, despite frequent prodding from Eden, never gave a thought to his, whatever they might be. His approach, he explained, was that of Mrs. Glass's recipe for Jugged Hare: "First catch your hare." First beat Hitler, then start thinking of the future of Britain and Europe. Churchill put in so many words: "the defeat, ruin, and slaughter of Hitler, to the exclusion of all other purposes, loyalties and aims."
Tuvia Ben-Moshe has shrewdly pinpointed one of the sources of this grotesque indifference:
Franklin Roosevelt's fatuousness towards Joseph Stalin is well known. He looked on Stalin as a fellow "progressive" and an invaluable collaborator in creating the future New World Order. But the neo-conservatives and others who counterpose to Roosevelt's inanity in this matter Churchill's Old World cunning and sagacity are sadly in error. Roosevelt's nauseating flattery of Stalin is easily matched by Churchill's. Just like Roosevelt, Churchill heaped fulsome praise on the Communist murderer, and was anxious for Stalin's personal friendship. Moreover, his adulation of Stalin and his version of Communism so different from the repellent "Trotskyite" kind was no different in private than in public. In January, 1944, he was still speaking to Eden of the "deep-seated changes which have taken place in the character of the Russian state and government, the new confidence which has grown in our hearts towards Stalin." In a letter to his wife, Clementine, Churchill wrote, following the October, 1944 conference in Moscow: "I have had very nice talks with the old Bear. I like him the more I see him. Now they respect us & I am sure they wish to work with us." Writers like Isaiah Berlin, who try to give the impression that Churchill hated or despised all dictators, including Stalin, are either ignorant or dishonest.
Churchill's supporters often claim that, unlike the Americans, the seasoned and crafty British statesman foresaw the danger from the Soviet Union and worked doggedly to thwart it. Churchill's famous "Mediterranean" strategy to attack Europe through its "soft underbelly," rather than concentrating on an invasion of northern France is supposed to be the proof of this. But this was an ex post facto defense, concocted by Churchill once the Cold War had started: there is little, if any, contemporary evidence that the desire to beat the Russians to Vienna and Budapest formed any part of Churchill's motivation in advocating the "soft underbelly" strategy. At the time, Churchill gave purely military reasons for it. As Ben-Moshe states: "The official British historians have ascertained that not until the second half of 1944 and after the Channel crossing did Churchill first begin to consider preempting the Russians in southeastern Europe by military means." By then, such a move would have been impossible for several reasons. It was another of Churchill's bizarre military notions, like invading Fortress Europe through Norway, or putting off the invasion of northern France until 1945 by which time the Russians would have reached the Rhine.
Moreover, the American opposition to Churchill's southern strategy did not stem from blindness to the Communist danger. As General Albert C. Wedemeyer, one of the firmest anti-Communists in the American military, wrote:
Churchill's benign view of Stalin and Russia contrasts sharply with his view of Germany. Behind Hitler, Churchill discerned the old specter of Prussianism, which had caused, allegedly, not only the two world wars, but the Franco Prussian War as well. What he was battling now was "Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism," the "two main elements in German life which must be absolutely destroyed." In October, 1944, Churchill was still explaining to Stalin that: "The problem was how to prevent Germany getting on her feet in the lifetime of our grandchildren." Churchill harbored a "confusion of mind on the subject of the Prussian aristocracy, Nazism, and the sources of German militarist expansionism . . . [his view] was remarkably similar to that entertained by Sir Robert Vansittart and Sir Warren Fisher; that is to say, it arose from a combination of almost racialist antipathy and balance of power calculations." Churchill's aim was not simply to save world civilization from the Nazis, but, in his words, the "indefinite prevention of their [the Germans'] rising again as an Armed Power."
Little wonder, then, that Churchill refused even to listen to the pleas of the anti-Hitler German opposition, which tried repeatedly to establish liaison with the British government. Instead of making every effort to encourage and assist an anti-Nazi coup in Germany, Churchill responded to the feelers sent out by the German resistance with cold silence. Reiterated warnings from Adam von Trott and other resistance leaders of the impending "bolshevization" of Europe made no impression at all on Churchill. A recent historian has written: "by his intransigence and refusal to countenance talks with dissident Germans, Churchill threw away an opportunity to end the war in July 1944." To add infamy to stupidity, Churchill and his crowd had only words of scorn for the valiant German officers even as they were being slaughtered by the Gestapo.
In place of help, all Churchill offered Germans looking for a way to end the war before the Red Army flooded into central Europe was the slogan of unconditional surrender. Afterwards, Churchill lied in the House of Commons about his role at Casablanca in connection with Roosevelt's announcement of the policy of unconditional surrender, and was forced to retract his statements. Eisenhower, among others, strenuously and persistently objected to the unconditional surrender formula as hampering the war effort by raising the morale of the Wehrmacht. In fact, the slogan was seized on by Goebbels, and contributed to the Germans' holding out to the bitter end.
The pernicious effect of the policy was immeasurably bolstered by the Morgenthau Plan, which gave the Germans a terrifying picture of what "unconditional surrender" would mean. This plan, initialed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec, called for turning Germany into an agricultural and pastoral country; even the coal mines of the Ruhr were to be wrecked. The fact that it would have led to the deaths of tens of millions of Germans made it a perfect analog to Hitler's schemes for dealing with Russia and the Ukraine.
Churchill was initially averse to the plan. However, he was won over by Professor Lindemann, as maniacal a German-hater as Morgenthau himself. Lindemann stated to Lord Moran, Churchill's personal physician: "I explained to Winston that the plan would save Britain from bankruptcy by eliminating a dangerous competitor. . . . Winston had not thought of it in that way, and he said no more about a cruel threat to the German people." According to Morgenthau, the wording of the scheme was drafted entirely by Churchill. When Roosevelt returned to Washington, Hull, and Stimson expressed their horror, and quickly disabused the President. Churchill, on the other hand, was unrepentant. When it came time to mention the Morgenthau Plan in his history of the war, he distorted its provisions and, by implication, lied about his role in supporting it.
Beyond the issue of the plan itself, Lord Moran wondered how it had been possible for Churchill to appear at the Quebec conference "without any thought out views on the future of Germany, although she seemed to be on the point of surrender." The answer was that "he had become so engrossed in the conduct of the war that little time was left to plan for the future":
There are a number of episodes during the war revealing of Churchill's character that deserve to be mentioned. A relatively minor incident was the British attack on the French fleet, at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran), off the coast of Algeria. After the fall of France, Churchill demanded that the French surrender their fleet to Britain. The French declined, promising that they would scuttle the ships before allowing them to fall into German hands. Against the advice of his naval officers, Churchill ordered British ships off the Algerian coast to open fire. About 1500 French sailors were killed. This was obviously a war crime, by anyone's definition: an unprovoked attack on the forces of an ally without a declaration of war. At Nuremberg, German officers were sentenced to prison for less. Realizing this, Churchill lied about Mers-el-Kebir in his history, and suppressed evidence concerning it in the official British histories of the war. With the attack on the French fleet, Churchill confirmed his position as the prime subverter through two world wars of the system of rules of warfare that had evolved in the West over centuries.
But the great war crime which will be forever linked to Churchill's name is the terror-bombing of the cities of Germany that in the end cost the lives of around 600,000 civilians and left some 800,000 seriously injured. (Compare this to the roughly 70,000 British lives lost to German air attacks. In fact, there were nearly as many Frenchmen killed by Allied air attacks as there were Englishmen killed by Germans.) The plan was conceived mainly by Churchill's friend and scientific advisor, Professor Lindemann, and carried out by the head of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris ("Bomber Harris"). Harris stated: "In Bomber Command we have always worked on the assumption that bombing anything in Germany is better than bombing nothing." Harris and other British airforce leaders boasted that Britain had been the pioneer in the massive use of strategic bombing. J.M. Spaight, former Principal Assistant Secretary of the Air Ministry, noted that while the Germans (and the French) looked on air power as largely an extension of artillery, a support to the armies in the field, the British understood its capacity to destroy the enemy's home-base. They built their bombers and established Bomber Command accordingly.
Brazenly lying to the House of Commons and the public, Churchill claimed that only military and industrial installations were targeted. In fact, the aim was to kill as many civilians as possible thus, "area" bombing, or "carpet" bombing and in this way to break the morale of the Germans and terrorize them into surrendering.
Harris at least had the courage of his convictions. He urged that the government openly announce that:
The most infamous act was the destruction of Dresden, in February, 1945. According to the official history of the Royal Air Force: "The destruction of Germany was by then on a scale which might have appalled Attila or Genghis Khan." Dresden, which was the capital of the old kingdom of Saxony, was an indispensable stop on the Grand Tour, the baroque gem of Europe. The war was practically over, the city filled with masses of helpless refugees escaping the advancing Red Army. Still, for three days and nights, from February 13 to 15, Dresden was pounded with bombs. At least 30,000 people were killed, perhaps as many as 135,000 or more. The Zwinger Palace; Our Lady's Church (die Frauenkirche); the Bruhl Terrace, overlooking the Elbe where, in Turgenev's Fathers and Sons, Uncle Pavel went to spend his last years; the Semper Opera House, where Richard Strauss conducted the premiere of Rosenkavalier; and practically everything else was incinerated. Churchill had fomented it. But he was shaken by the outcry that followed. While in Georgetown and Hollywood, few had ever heard of Dresden, the city meant something in Stockholm, Zurich, and the Vatican, and even in London. What did our hero do? He sent a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff:
And still the bombing continued. On March 16, in a period of 20 minutes, Würzburg was razed to the ground. As late as the middle of April, Berlin and Potsdam were bombed yet again, killing another 5,000 civilians. Finally, it stopped; as Bomber Harris noted, there were essentially no more targets to be bombed in Germany. It need hardly be recorded that Churchill supported the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which resulted in the deaths of another 100,000, or more, civilians. When Truman fabricated the myth of the "500,000 U.S. lives saved" by avoiding an invasion of the Home Islands the highest military estimate had been 46,000. Churchill topped his lie: the atom-bombings had saved 1,200,000 lives, including 1,000,000 Americans, he fantasized.
The eagerness with which Churchill directed or applauded the destruction of cities from the air should raise questions for those who still consider him the great "conservative" of his or perhaps of all time. They would do well to consider the judgment of an authentic conservative like Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, who wrote: "Non-Britishers did not matter to Mr. Churchill, who sacrificed human beings their lives, their welfare, their liberty with the same elegant disdain as his colleague in the White House."
1945: The Dark Side
And so we come to 1945 and the ever-radiant triumph of Absolute Good over Absolute Evil. So potent is the mystique of that year that the insipid welfare states of today's Europe clutch at it at every opportunity, in search of a few much-needed shreds of glory.
The dark side of that triumph, however, has been all but suppressed. It is the story of the crimes and atrocities of the victors and their protégés. Since Winston Churchill played a central role in the Allied victory, it is the story also of the crimes and atrocities in which Churchill was implicated. These include the forced repatriation of some two million Soviet subjects to the Soviet Union. Among these were tens of thousands who had fought with the Germans against Stalin, under the sponsorship of General Vlasov and his "Russian Army of Liberation." This is what Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote, in The Gulag Archipelago:
The massacres carried out by Churchill's protégé, Tito, must be added to this list: tens of thousands of Croats, not simply the Ustasha, but any "class-enemies," in classical Communist style. There was also the murder of some 20,000 Slovene anti-Communist fighters by Tito and his killing squads. When Tito's Partisans rampaged in Trieste, which he was attempting to grab in 1945, additional thousands of Italian anti-Communists were massacred.
As the troops of Churchill's Soviet ally swept through central Europe and the Balkans, the mass deportations began. Some in the British government had qualms, feeling a certain responsibility. Churchill would have none of it. In January, 1945, for instance, he noted to the Foreign Office: "Why are we making a fuss about the Russian deportations in Rumania of Saxons [Germans] and others? . . . I cannot see the Russians are wrong in making 100 or 150 thousand of these people work their passage. . . . I cannot myself consider that it is wrong of the Russians to take Rumanians of any origin they like to work in the Russian coal-fields." About 500,000 German civilians were deported to work in Soviet Russia, in accordance with Churchill and Roosevelt's agreement at Yalta that such slave labor constituted a proper form of "reparations."
Worst of all was the expulsion of some 15 million Germans from their ancestral homelands in East and West Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, and the Sudetenland. This was done pursuant to the agreements at Tehran, where Churchill proposed that Poland be "moved west," and to Churchill's acquiescence in the Czech leader Eduard Benes's plan for the "ethnic cleansing" of Bohemia and Moravia. Around one-and-a-half to two million German civilians died in this process. As the Hungarian liberal Gaspar Tamas wrote, in driving out the Germans of east-central Europe, "whose ancestors built our cathedrals, monasteries, universities, and railroad stations," a whole ancient culture was effaced. But why should that mean anything to the Churchill devotees who call themselves "conservatives" in America today?
Then, to top it all, came the Nuremberg Trials, a travesty of justice condemned by the great Senator Robert Taft, where Stalin's judges and prosecutors, seasoned veterans of the purges of the 30s, participated in another great show-trial.
By 1946, Churchill was complaining in a voice of outrage of the happenings in eastern Europe: "From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended over Europe." Goebbels had popularized the phrase "iron curtain," but it was accurate enough.
The European continent now contained a single, hegemonic power. "As the blinkers of war were removed," John Charmley writes, "Churchill began to perceive the magnitude of the mistake which had been made." In fact, Churchill's own expressions of profound self-doubt consort oddly with his admirers' retrospective triumphalism. After the war, he told Robert Boothby: "Historians are apt to judge war ministers less by the victories achieved under their direction than by the political results which flowed from them. Judged by that standard, I am not sure that I shall be held to have done very well." In the preface to the first volume of his history of World War II, Churchill explained why he was so troubled:
With the balance of power in Europe wrecked by his own policy, there was only one recourse open to Churchill: to bring America into Europe permanently. Thus, his anxious expostulations to the Americans, including his Fulton, Missouri "Iron Curtain" speech. Having destroyed Germany as the natural balance to Russia on the continent, he was now forced to try to embroil the United States in yet another war, this time a Cold War, that would last 45 years, and change America fundamentally, and perhaps irrevocably.
The Triumph of the Welfare State
In 1945, general elections were held in Britain, and the Labour Party won a landslide victory. Clement Attlee, and his colleagues took power and created the socialist welfare state. But the socializing of Britain was probably inevitable, given the war. It was a natural outgrowth of the wartime sense of solidarity and collectivist emotion, of the feeling that the experience of war had somehow rendered class structure and hierarchy, normal features of any advanced society, obsolete and indecent. And there was a second factor British society had already been to a large extent socialized in the war years, under Churchill himself. As Ludwig von Mises wrote:
Yet, in truth, Churchill never cared a great deal about domestic affairs, even welfarism, except as a means of attaining and keeping office. What he loved was power, and the opportunities power provided to live a life of drama and struggle and endless war.
There is a way of looking at Winston Churchill that is very tempting: that he was a deeply flawed creature, who was summoned at a critical moment to do battle with a uniquely appalling evil, and whose very flaws contributed to a glorious victory in a way, like Merlin, in C.S. Lewis's great Christian novel, That Hideous Strength. Such a judgment would, I believe, be superficial. A candid examination of his career, I suggest, yields a different conclusion: that, when all is said and done, Winston Churchill was a Man of Blood and a politico without principle, whose apotheosis serves to corrupt every standard of honesty and morality in politics and history.
Due to space limitations, the 169 detailed footnotes – which thoroughly document all assertions in Professor Raico's paper – are not included. They are, of course, included in the printed version of the paper, published in The Costs of War.
Ralph Raico [send him mail] is Professor Emeritus in European history at Buffalo State College is a senior fellow of the Mises Institute. He is a specialist on the history of liberty, the liberal tradition in Europe, and the relationship between war and the rise of the state. He is the author of The Place of Religion in the Liberal Philosophy of Constant, Tocqueville, and Lord Acton. His latest book is Great Wars and Great Leaders: A Libertarian Rebuttal. You can study the history of civilization under his guidance here: MP3-CD and Audio Tape.
|April 28th, 2013||#2|
Join Date: Nov 2004
I am certainly no fan of the late Mihailovich but certain facts need to be stated.
Betrayal of the General
At the closing years of WWII the West (Britain in the first place) decided to betray their Serbian ally -- the Serbian Royalists of General Mihajlović -- and flip to the side of the Croat Communist Tito.
Up to that moment the West was disregarding Tito and his forces so completely that they did not even care to learn Tito's name. Notice that Encyclopedia Britannica, in the Book of the Year 1945 (on page 131) has entry - "Brozovich or Broz, Josip (Tito)." Tito never called himself Brozovich.
The prime mover behind this change of hearts was British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill himself. The net result of this British treason of a devoted ally was to help Communists take power in Yugoslavia. In Greece which also had two guerilla movements as if mirror image of Yugoslavia, the British Government took the opposite choice. In Greece they decided to crush the Communists at any cost. This way, British troops were instrumental in preventing Communist takeover of that country.
And here lies the puzzle: Why did Churchill insist so much that Yugoslav Communists should win when he insisted that at any cost -- including the cost of a civil war -- the Greek Communists should loose? We will have to try to deal with that complex issue in some later analysis.
The change to Tito's side was initially covert.
From declasified Roosevelt-Churchill secret wartime correspondence we see that it was Churchill who insisted that Mihajlović should be abandoned. Roosevelt went with it with no resistance. This is so shameless when one knows that it was Chetniks who were instrumental in saving more than 600 American aviators from German and Croat Ustashi hands and almost certain death. One may not care to know about some Chetniks but regardless of that this is a priceless lesson to any future American or British ally. The lesson is simple: Die for them if you want - they will use you - and then they will dump you.
We would like to show just how forcefull and how purposefull the treason was.
Encyclopedia Britannica, Book of the Year 1945, page 790, entry "Yugoslavia":
British and Russian backing of the partisans of Marshal Tito (Josip Brozovich) became more and more pronounced during 1944. British pressure was increased on the royal Yugoslav government under King Peter [which was in exile in London] to drop General Draja Mikhailovitch as minister of war and to seek an agreement with Marshal Tito.
At the end of January  a national congress was held secretly [by Royalists of General Mikhailovitch] in Serbia. According to the reports General Mikhailovitch and 273 delegates were present. They expressed their loyalty to King Peter and to the exile government. Dr. Zhivko Topalovich, a Serb labour leader, was elected president, Rusomir Jankovitch, a member of the Serb peasant party, vice-president of the congress. A constitution was drafted for Yugoslavia as a federation based upon the equality of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
In vain was Mihajlović trying to re-establish Yugoslavia as it was. Powerful Western forces were working toward establishing Communist Yugoslavia.
Here is how blunt British "pressure" for King to drop Mihajlović was. At the end of this game, as we will see Mihajlović would not only drop - he would drop - dead.
British and American newspaper cartoons ridicule King Peter and his resistance to the British support of Communist Tito.
Supposedly, King Peter is alone and without followers so he has to write "Long live King Peter" on London walls by himself.
London The News Chronicle, January 15, 1945.
King Peter has not only good advisors but also devoted friends among these Brits. Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden (British Foreign Secretary) are ready to save him but stubborn Peter jumps into Yugoslav "internal strife."
London Dayly Herald, January 24, 1945.
Silly, King Peter took "REJECTION" saw and is cutting Tito-Churchill prepared "REGENCY COMPROMISE" branch. If he remains defiant like that he will loose the crown.
British Evening Advertiser.
King Peter is but a Peter Pan; the boy who refuses to grow up. He is ripping "Tito-Subasich agreement" and flying his flag of "defiance."
London The Star.
|April 28th, 2013||#3|
Join Date: Nov 2004
An excerpt from 'The Forgotten 500' by Gregory A. Freeman:
It would be decades before Mihailovich’s suspicions about a Communist plot to besmirch his reputation with the British was confirmed. Not until 1997 would the world understand the switch of allegiance was orchestrated largely by a Soviet operative who convinced the British that Mihailovich could not be trusted.
The abandonment of Mihailovich was the culmination of a long series of suspicions and mistrust, not just the work of a single man, and Mihailovich’s own missteps must be considered. But the information revealed fifty-four years later indicates that the General was right about the primary reason the British thought he was collaborating with the enemy and failing to fight the Germans and Italians in Yugoslavia. Communist moles had infiltrated both the OSS and the SOE, working to besmirch the name of Mihailovich to promote the postwar communization of Yugoslavia under Tito. In 1997 newly declassified secret reports on one of the most controversial British undercover operations of World War II showed a Soviet spy was responsible for the British switching support to Tito, confirming the suspicions of some experts who had been studying the case for years. The documents included transcripts of secret wartime signals to London and included evidence of the role played by James Klugmann, a confirmed Soviet mole.
Reports sent by Klugmann, who was closely associated with the infamous British traitors known as the Cambridge Five, for the first time confirmed that he was principally responsible for sabotaging the Mihailovich supply operation and for keeping from London information about how much Mihailovich forces were fighting the Germans and how much success they were having. The Cambridge Five was a ring of British spies who passed information to the Soviet Union during World War II and on into the early 1950s. Proven members were Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, Donald Maclean, and John Cairncross ~ all high-ranking members of the government and secret agents. Klugmann was essentially the sixth member, though his role as a spy was not confirmed until after the rest of the group was identified. Philby served as head of the Soviet counterespionage section of M16, Britiain’s external security agency and top intelligence outfit. Burgess was secretary to the British Deputy Foreign Minister and able to transmit top-secret British Foreign Office documents to the KGB on a regular basis, secreting them out at night to be photographed by his Russian controller and returning them in the morning. Blunt was an art historian who had served the royal household as surveyor of the queen’s pictures. Maclean worked as a diplomat for the British Foreign Office, serving as secretary at the British embassy in Washington, DC, during the war and sending messages to Moscow revealing British efforts to develop an atomic bomb. Cairncross was an intelligence office working on ciphers at Bletchley Park and M16. He passed documents through secret channels to the Soviet Union.
Klugmann spent two and a half years working in Bari on the staff of the Yugoslav section of the British SOE as an intelligence and coordination officer ~ the SOE that Vujnovich (American of Yugolavian descent) knew was favoring Tito over Mihailovich for no good reason, and which ultimately persuaded Churchill to side with the Communists in Yugoslavia’s civil war. Klugmann’s work with the Yugoslav section was so influential that his commanding officer, Basil Davison, said ~ with admiration ~ that the time should be called the “Klugmann period.”
The group of traitors was orginally known as the Cambridge Spy Ring becase all known members of the ring were recruited at Trinity College in Cambridge while members of the Cambridge Apostles, a secret debating society. They also were open Communists and Klugmann was secretary for the Cambridge Communist Party in the mid-1930s. Like the Cambridge Five, Klugmann could more accurately be described as a mole rather than a typical spy. The difference is that, unlike a spy who embarks on a mission with specific objectives, moles entrench themselves in key government roles or other postions that make them privy to secrets ~ or the ability to manipulate leaders ~ and then wait for the right time to act. Moles often are ideologically driven to betray their countries, as opposed to mercenaries who act for money. The Soviets recruited Klugmann because he displayed a sympathy to leftist causes and was well on the path to a career in government or other sensitive work, the same as Philby, Burgess, Blunt, Maclean, and Cairncross. Taking their order from Moscow, their task was to direct British policy in a manner favorable to the worldwide Communist movement and Russia in particular. They did the job well. David Martin, the foremost historian on Yugoslavia during World War II, concluded that Klugmann was ultimately responsible for leading the British to abandon Mihailovich, and that he was responsible for the postwar Communist expansion in the Balkans. “Klugmann was a mole whose great accomplishment was to falsify information in a manner that resulted in handing over a nation of fifteen million people to Communist control,” he wrote.
Klugmann was a bespectacled bookworm, warm-hearted and compassionate but so fiecely devoted to Communism that he had little time for personal relationship. Blunt, after he was exposed as a traitor and his knighthood for wartime service revoked, described Klugmann as “the pure intellectual of the Party,” more dedicated than any other Communist in Britain. Even though he spent little time on personal relationshps, while at Cambridge he was among the most effective in recruiting other students to the Communist cause, and he could channel his political energy into manipulating those around him. The recently declassified files reveal that, for instance, Klugmann had great influence over Colonel Sir William Deakin, the senior intelligence officer in Yugoslavia, who said Klugmann provided “invaluable service.” The declassified files reveal that Klugmann used his relationship with Deakin to advance Tito’s cause, always claiming to act in the best interest of Great Britain but in fact working to further the Societ Union’s goal of a Communist Yugoslavia after the war by exaggerating claims of Mihailovich’s transgressions, minimizing reports of his accomplishments, and glorifying the action of Tito. All of the Cambridge Five used other unsuspecting people to serve the Soviet Union’s goals. While the Soviets had operatives in the British intelligence services, Martin notes that the actual number of Communists in the top ranks was small. ”Far more numerous than the Communists, and infinitely more numerous than the committed agents, were the muddleheaded liberals who shared a nebulous feeling that they, too, were serving the cause of progress,” Martin writies. The naivete of these government officials, and their desire to feel important, made them susceptible to Communist efforts to disseminate disinformation about Mihailovich. Klugman and his fellow traitors may have been driving the effort to defeat Miahilovich from abroad, but there were many more British officials who unwittingly helped them along the way. As in the OSS, a person’s Communist beliefs did not necessarily bar one from serving in the SOE, and those around Klugmann knew of his party affiliation but overlooked it because he was so hardworking, amiable, and seemed to produce good results.
On March 15, 1944, Klugmann moved from Cairo to Bari along with most of the other SOE staff. One of his duties was to educate newly arriving SOE staff about the Mihailovich and Tito conflict, briefing them on the opposing sides in Yugoslavia and where the British stood. The most influential Communist spy in Europe was working practically right alongside Vujnovich and his colleagues, quitely but effectively sabotaging every effort to help Mihailovich and ensuring that Yugoslavia would be in the hands of the Soviet Union after the war.
One of the most active and overt British Communists of his generation, Klugmann became an influential left-wing journalist after the war, serving as editor of Marxism Today and writing the first two volumes of the official Hisotry of the Communist Party of Great Britain.
[The Forgotten 500 by Gregory A. Freeman, Pg 142 -145.]
This ultimate of betrayals led to the execution by firing squad of General Mihailovich on July 17, 1946 by his rival Tito in Belgrade, Serbia. He was buried in an unmarked grave. And the Forgotten 500 Americans who were saved by him, the reason for the writiing of the book The Forgotten 500, were devastated because, of course, Tito dismissed all their pleas and written communications to testify at his trial, that they felt was absolutely unjust, and these grown American men cried when they heard the verdict.
|January 14th, 2015||#4|
Join Date: Jul 2014
The Buying of Mr. Churchill
PUBLISHED BY MICHAEL OLANICH, ON JANUARY 14TH, 2015
by Dr. William Pierce
THE MAN MOST directly responsible for the demise of the British Empire and its replacement as a world power by the Soviet Empire is Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill (1874-1965). The policies which he advocated as a member of the British government in the period just before World War II and the policies which he followed as prime minister during that war were diametrically opposed to the interests of the British people and led ultimately to the sad plight in which Britain finds herself today. Churchill acted as he did, because he consciously and deliberately served alien interests from 1938, at the latest, until the end of the war.
Winston Churchill was the descendant of a noble family, the son of Lord Randolph Churchill, who was the third son of the seventh duke of Marlborough. As a young man Winston was a dilettante who early developed a lifelong taste for expensive clothes, imported cigars, old brandy, and the other amenities of “the good life. (ILLUSTRATION: Churchill liked to think of himself as a great warlord, but he came across at the personal level as a petty gangster: theatrical, irresponsible, and immensely vain.)
Although he enjoyed a brief and desultory stint as a newspaper correspondent in his early twenties, he soon decided that he could more readily support the style of life to which he wished to become accustomed by claiming a place for himself at the public trough. At the age of 26 he entered Parliament.
As a politician young Churchill continued his dilettante ways, serving in a number of minor posts and switching from one party to another whenever he thought such a move would further his career. Although he displayed only minimal qualities of statesmanship, his family connections and his sharp eye for the main chance led to his steady advancement, and in 1908 he was promoted to the cabinet. When World War I broke out Churchill became first lord of the admiralty, with the job of supervising the British Navy.
In the latter post Churchill’s lack of a mature sense of responsibility and his ineptness as a military strategist led to disaster. He directed the utterly bungled Gallipoli campaign against the Turks in 1915, which led to a total defeat for the British, with more than 100,000 casualties.
Forced to resign his admiralty post in disgrace, Churchill decided to concentrate his energies on developing his one talent: a gift for theatrical oratory. Spending as much as six weeks preparing for a single speech, he would carefully rehearse every intonation and dramatic pause, carefully practice every gesture and facial expression before a mirror. He became a demagogue of rare ability.
Neither his disgrace as a military bungler nor his subsequent success as a political spellbinder abated his taste for expensive living, however, and in the period between the first and second world wars Churchill habitually lived far beyond his means. Finally in 1938, when he was 64 years old, his creditors prepared to foreclose on him, and he was faced with the prospect of a forced sale of his luxurious country estate.
At this hour of crisis a dark and mysterious figure entered Churchill’s life: he was Henry Strakosch, a multimillionaire Jew who had acquired a fortune speculating in South African mining ventures after his family had migrated to that country from eastern Austria. Strakosch stepped forward, advanced the aging demagogue a “loan” of 150,000 pounds just in time to save his estate from the auctioneer, and then quietly slipped into the background again. In the years that followed, Strakosch served as Churchill’s adviser and confidant but miraculously managed to avoid the spotlight of publicity which thenceforth illuminated Churchill’s again-rising political career.
Churchill immediately became the sharpest Parliamentary critic of his own party’s (at that time he had once again switched from the Liberals back to the ruling Conservatives) policy of detente with National Socialist Germany. He took up the Jewish cry, “Delenda est Germania – Germany must be destroyed,” and urged his government, in a series of jingoistic and bloodthirsty speeches, to join the Jewish “holy war” against Hitler. This was the same Churchill who, in September 1937, had said of Hitler: “If our country were defeated, I hope we should find a champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations.”
CHURCHILL’S relationship with the Jews changed markedly during his political career. In the 1920’s and the early 1930’s he was not afraid to criticize Jews occasionally – or to praise Hitler – but after receiving 150,000 pounds from Henry Strakosch In 1938 he thenceforth uttered only the most extravagant praise for Jews and the most vitriolic condemnations of Hitler and Germany. Even as early as 1920, however, Churchill was careful to salt his criticisms of “bad Jews” and their destructive activities with obsequious references to “good Jews” and their supposed benevolence. This article [see the Appendix for its full text. — Ed.] in the Illustrated Sunday Herald of February 8, 1920, roused the Jews to a fury against Churchill, because it exposed communism as a Jewish plot for world domination. Churchill’s praise of Zionism and his erroneous attribution of Christian morals and philosophy to Jews did little to salve their outrage. It is difficult to decide whether the rose-colored view of Zionism expressed here is due to naivete or hypocrisy. Perhaps he genuinely believed that Zionism was a movement “in harmony with the truest interests of the British Empire,” rather than an alternative Jewish plot for world domination fully as evil and dangerous as communism; perhaps not. In any event, it is clear that, despite the fulsome Jew-fawning of the first few paragraphs of his article, Churchill was issuing a thinly veiled warning to the Jews in Britain: “Behave, or else; repudiate the communist activities and doctrines of your fellow Jews and help us keep the communist menace from taking over Britain, or we’ll all know whom to blame.” After 1938 Churchill never came close to making as frank a public statement on the Jewish problem as this; the struggle for his own soul had been decided, and the Jews were the victors. And having sold out to the Jews, Churchill then had no qualms about dealing with communists as well; he sat down with Joseph Stalin and planned the post-WW II dismemberment of the British Empire. There is one minor error in the article above: Lenin was actually at least one-quarter Jewish; and one major piece of hypocrisy: Churchill knew well that the “national” Jews he praised for their contribution to the British war effort actually came over to the British side only after helping their Zionist brethren extort from the British government a promise of aid in securing Palestine as a future Jewish state.
And as soon as Churchill changed his tune toward Hitler, the dark forces behind the scenes which had ignored him for 23 years began pulling the right strings for him again. In September 1939, immediately upon Britain’s declaration of war against Germany — largely as a consequence of Churchill’s insistent, demagogic oratory — he was again made first lord of the admiralty, the very post from which he had been forced in disgrace 24 years earlier! This time, however, Churchill’s reckless disregard for British lives and British welfare was to cost far more than the 100,000 casualties of his first fling at grand strategy.
In May 1940 the strings were pulled once again, and Churchill became prime minister. Britain and her empire were now his to expend as profligately as he wished in the service of his new masters. And expend them he did. His sole aim was the destruction of Germany, regardless of the cost to Britain. This aim, dictated by the Jews he served, was poorly concealed behind a mask of false idealism. Churchill’s ostensible motive in urging a declaration of war against Germany in September 1939 had been the protection of Poland from German aggression, and his Parliamentary rhetoric on behalf of the poor Poles was loud and eloquent. When the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland later that same month, however, Churchill angrily denounced those critics who suggested that his own arguments for a declaration of war against Germany applied equally well now to a British declaration of war against the Soviets. Obviously, Churchill had no intention of using the sauce for the goose as sauce for the gander.
Churchill repeatedly rejected peace offers from Germany in 1940 and 1941, even siding with the Labor members of the cabinet against his own party when the other Conservatives in the cabinet wanted to end the war. When Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, flew to England on a solo peace mission in May 1941, Churchill had him immediately arrested and held incommunicado. (Hess remains in solitary confinement to this day.) [ED. NOTE: Hess has since died, still imprisoned at the age of 93, in August of 1987.]
WINNIE AND JOE, bosom pals. Churchill posed for this arm-in-arm picture with Stalin in the Kremlin In August 1942. He apparently swallowed his former hatred of the Bolsheviks while he was in the service of the Jews — unless that hatred was as phony as everything else in his life.
Churchill was a participant in the wartime strategy conferences with Roosevelt and Stalin at which a new division of the world’s territory and resources was mapped out. In this division of the spoils of war Britain was sadly shortchanged, but Churchill was unperturbed. With a big cigar clenched in his teeth and suffused with the warm glow of expensive brandy, he merely flashed his two finger “victory” sign, and his media cheering section waxed ecstatic about his “statesmanship.” Whatever he did was now beyond criticism — and this included his utterly cynical acquiescence in the handing over of Poland to Stalin after the war, thus revealing once again the hypocrisy of his avowed war aim in 1939: to save Polish freedom.
One of Churchill’s last acts of “statesmanship” at the behest of the Jews was his insistence on the massive Anglo-American terror raid on Dresden in February 1945, a hate-inspired act of Jewish vengeance against the German people which cost the lives of approximately 200,000 men, women, and children and served no military purpose whatever.
In the postwar years the sun set on one portion after another of the British Empire, and the entire process of disintegration was set in motion by Churchill in his reckless disregard of British interests during the seven-year period, 1938-1945, when he served an alien master. Yet, the establishment history texts continue to heap lavish praise on Churchill, extolling his “greatness.” If there is anything truly remarkable that Winston Churchill should be remembered for, it is his success in raising the price of treason from 30 pieces of silver to 150,000 pounds sterling.
* * *
From Attack! Issue No. 34, 1977, transcribed by Michael Olanich, from The Best of Attack! And National Vanguard, edited by Kevin Alfred Strom.
|January 16th, 2015||#6|
Join Date: Jan 2015
When the japs invaded New Guinea, it was the Australian reserve soldiers that fought them. Our regular soldiers were in North Africa and chuchill refused to allow them to come back to Australia to defend our nation.
|January 16th, 2015||#7|
Join Date: Feb 2014
I was aware of this-
Churchill didn't care if Aus was lost. All Churchill cared about was England defeating Germany at any cost. Churchill wasn't a friend of ours.
Today, the Australian navy and military is pretty big. UK wouldn't even have the nerve to dictate to us on "where our military should be".
|March 27th, 2015||#8|
Join Date: Jun 2012
But those boys (and nearly all of them were boys, hardly more than 18, and in a lot of cases younger) put up a real fight against the Japanese, and earned the respect of regular Australian soldiers and the rest of the Australian people.
Many of them were decorated for heroism - in fact, the Japanese themselves rated the 'fighting spirit' and morale of those Australian soldiers well above the Americans or the British they had been fighting up until that point.
As for Churchill ... his disregard for Australia's territorial security is what drove Curtin and the rest of the Australian leadership over to the Americans. Basically, he's the reason Australia is so close to America nowadays.
No, the UK wouldn't dictate to us where our military should be - that's what the Americans do nowadays, instead.
|June 12th, 2017||#9|
Join Date: Nov 2003
Blog Entries: 34
Former Canadian Diplomat & Free Speech Warrior Ian Macdonald on the Movie Churchill
June 10, 2017
Re: Churchill: the Movie (NP June 9, 2017)
Churchill certainly acted on occasion as a "doddering fool" as portrayed in the new movie Churchill, reviewed by Chris Knight' (NP June 9, 2017). However, to dismiss his disastrous seeming ineptitude as merely drunken stupidity, hardly does him credit. The Great Man was arguably the most profoundly evil war criminal of all time. He was also probably the greatest con-artist ever, spellbinding the media and whole otherwise-sane populations into thinking WWII was a splendid idea, even though the catastrophic experience of WWI was still within recent living memory.
In 1939, Churchill and his "War Party" campaigned for war against Germany in the full knowledge that the real threat to Western Civilization was Bolshevist Russia, not our cultured Christian German kinfolk who had done nothing to harm us. Clear confirmation of his perfidy emerged when Germany and Russia invaded Poland and Britain declared war only on Germany' when the occasion called for neutrality and eventually a NATO-style alliance to overthrow the cruel Soviet dictatorship and liberate its terrorized subjects.
Britain had a second chance to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat in 1940 when Hitler offered a munificent peace treaty that would have saved the British Empire and millions of lives, but Churchill, inflamed by hatred imparted by his secret, vengeful Zionist paymasters, rejected the offers and doomed Britain, and Western Civilization to inevitable collapse.
For this calamitous, contrived blunder and his many other fatal decisions, "that Bastard Churchill", as he was known to colleagues who understood him, does not deserve enshrinement in movies as a statesman, no matter how inept, but rather should be condemned in perpetuity as an arch-traitor and war monger supreme, responsible for incalculable loss of life and loss of freedom, especially freedom of speech, by survivors and their descendants.
Churchill's image as a competent and fearless leader is a myth that can be demolished easily by any objective, intrepid researcher. The myth originated when Churchill was sent to South Africa as a young correspondent to cover the Boer War. To create a story, he persuaded a gullible local British Commander to send an armoured train into Boer territory and to take him along. The Boers readily captured the train, taking the troops and Churchill prisoner. Churchill, left unguarded, easily "escaped", and was given undeserved acclaim, while the British Commander was reprimanded for his folly.
The notoriety helped Churchill win a seat in Parliament and eventually appointment as First Lord of the Admiralty, He soon revealed his bloated ego and incompetence in the Dardanelles Campaign when thousands of Australians and New Zealanders were mindlessly sacrificed in a hopeless assault (a lethal stupidity Churchill repeated when he sent Canadian soldiers to be slaughtered on the impassable beach-front at Dieppe).
In the mid-'thirties, the discredited warmonger, after accepting large payments from Jewish-American millionaires to stave off his impending bankruptcy, formed a group known as the "War Party" that strongly urged Britain to make war on Germany. After war was declared and the British Army quickly defeated, Britain was left defenceless, but spared by the pro-British Hitler who allowed the 300,000 man British Army to leave France unhindered. and offered Britain an honourable peace that would have preserved the Empire intact, with German military protection if required. Although Hitler's magnanimity made possible the "miracle of Dunkirk", Churchill, contemptuously and contemptibly, rejected the peace offer, sealing the fate of hundreds of millions, dooming Western Christian civilization and sacrificing his own country, simply to satisfy his quest for Supreme War Lord status and to satisfy his Shylockian Zionist paymasters.
As for hero status, he was a coward, cynically trashing the lives of trusting subjects, military and civilian, while ensuring his own safety (during the Blitz, Churchill would leave London when Intelligence informed him of an impending Luftwaffe attack, then return to bomb sites as soon as the raid ended for photo-ops, giving the impression he had shared the danger).
To satisfy his blood-lust and ensure, before the war's end, his place as the most indefatigably sadistic war criminal of WWII, he ordered the fire-bombing of the undefended City of Dresden, knowing it was packed with women and children fleeing the rapacious Red Army and that most would be burned alive in the holocaust. (W/C "Giff" Gifford of St. John, NB, who unwittingly led an RCAF Squadron in the diabolical attack said, upon learning of the purpose and result of the raid (as told to the Senate CBC "Valour & Horror" enquiry) that he "felt remorse every day" for the rest of his life for the murder of the innocents and mindless obliteration of Europe's most beautiful architectural treasures).
Churchill was my childhood hero for whom I was - literally, by enlisting in Air Crew - prepared to die. I now see him for what he was; a drunken, unscrupulous, corrupt, cynical, racist, immoral, dishonest, self-serving arch-traitor. Ironically, it was his nation's would-be saviour, the much reviled Adolf Hitler, whom I was taught to hate, and who graciously offered an optimum solution which would have handed Britain not only a real victory but also would have liberated Stalin's terrified subjects. A genuine statesman, he would have made possible a permanent Pax Germanicus-Britannicus-Americanus that would have freed the Western Democracies from rule by a cunning, parasitical, hostile, powerful Enemy Within (against whom Hitler repeatedly warned) who were (and are) a far greater threat to our freedom than ever was posed by our resurgent, friendly, compatible, cultured German kin..
Churchill became an icon by combining outrageous chutzpah with cunning, deception, duplicity and unmatched eloquence but as a leader was hardly more competent than Steven Harper, and couldn't hold a candle to Mackenzie King, or Hitler, for that matter. Most young Canadians of my era fell for his oratory, and many paid with their lives.
Had justice prevailed, Churchill would have been charged, convicted and hanged as the greatest war criminal of WWII, if not of all time. By declaring war, then prolonging the war instead of accepting Hitler's generous offer of an honourable peace in 1940, he caused 150 million unnecessary casualties, incalculable suffering, destroyed Britain, the country he cynically pretended to save, eliminated Christian Germany as a bulwark against the genocidal Soviet dictatorship, betrayed Poland into Stalin's clutches and, calamitously, as it turned out, abandoned innocent, defenceless Palestinians to the tender mercies of sadistic, predatory Zionists.
Churchill set the stage for the Cold War, Middle East wars, Third World chaos, ethnic conflict, refugee invasions and subversion of the Western Christian democracies, leaving them under hostile Jewish hegemony - a much more deadly threat to their race, traditions, property, freedom and ultimate survival than the invented threat posed by Hitler's Germany. Had it not been for Churchill's diabolical treachery, which cannot be excused by mere bouts of drunken megalomania, the world today would be, in every respect, a far better and safer place.
Ian V. Macdonald
Ex-RCAF, RNFAA, Canadian Foreign Service rtd.
Author "Star Weekly at War", "OTTAWA - the Golden Years" etc
Member, Dominion Command, Royal Canadian Legion
|June 12th, 2017||#10|
Join Date: Nov 2006
Good comments here on Churchill, but Churchill never operated in a vacuum. The 100% Zionist "Focus" which had bankrolled Churchill for years called all the shots, just as Roosevelt's Zionist cabinet directed American war policy. More and more now I think Hitler never truly understood the final power of the sect he went up against. Far more, it was/is, than just the "money power" and social /economic parasitism.
No way out but through the jews.